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1 
Economic Cost Recovery in the Recycling of Packaging Waste:  
The Case of Portugal 
 
Abstract: 
The recycling of packaging waste is an objective of the Community with clear targets set in the 
European law. The study of the institutional arrangements, recycling systems and of the costs 
that resulted from this environmental policy represents an ongoing effort. While each member 
state has currently its own packaging waste management system, there is still a lack of evidence 
regarding the actual costs of recycling and on how these costs have been distributed among 
stakeholders. This paper addresses the Portuguese framework and discusses the financial 
transfers undertaken by the entity that manages the Green Dot scheme. For this purpose, we use 
data from the entities in charge of selective collection and sorting of household packaging waste 
for the year 2010. We compare the financial transfers of the Green Dot company with the costs 
incurred by the local authorities (which are generally in charge of selective collection and 
sorting) and open a discussion on the extent to which the principles of the Directive on 
Packaging and Packaging Waste are being fulfilled in practice. Currently, the Green Dot 
company is only bearing 77% of the financial costs of the recycling systems in operation in 
Portugal. The unit cost of the selective collection and sorting of packaging waste is estimated to 
be 204 €/ton collected. 
 
Keywords: green dot; packaging waste; Portugal; recycling. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Experience shows that there are undeniable advantages in recycling some types of packaging 
waste (Lavee, 2007). Indeed, even before the Directive 94/62/EC on Packaging and Packaging 
2 
Waste (PPW) entered into force in 1994, significant quantities of packaging were already 
recycled in several member states (European Commission, 2006). In principle, the recycling of 
packaging waste should reduce the consumption of raw materials. Moreover, the resulting 
decrease in waste disposal is likely to increase the lifespan of sanitary landfills (Fullerton and 
Kinnaman, 1995). In addition to the potential financial savings with landfilling, reducing the 
quantity of waste to be disposed of in landfills or incinerated should reduce soil, water and air 
contamination (reduced emissions). By adopting a whole life-cycle approach, recycling can help 
the competent authorities to better manage natural resources (raw materials, territory, water and 
soil quality levels, etc.). 
 
Recycling also generates additional financial costs either for the private (e.g. the industry) or 
public (e.g. waste management operators) sector stakeholders (Massarutto et al., 2011). These 
extra-costs are often translated into higher prices for goods or additional waste management 
tariffs or taxes. Moreover, recyclables and, more specifically, sorted packaging waste can have a 
rather low market value, sometimes even negative. This is particularly true when raw materials 
are inexpensive.
1
 Among other aspects, the net economic sustainability of the recycling of 
packaging waste is therefore connected with the type of packaging material recycled. Recycling 
schemes are also highly prone to the “free-riding” problem (Yau, 2010). Free-riders, 
packers/fillers that do not pay the license fees to the entities in charge of managing the logistic 
chain of packaging waste recycling (e.g. Green Dot Agencies or similar structures), undermine 
the economic sustainability of recycling systems and create market distortions (Eichstadt and 
Kahlenborn, 2000). The logistics chain of recycling is usually quite complex. To set up an 
effective system requires high up-front costs (investments in new infrastructure for selective 
collection and sorting of packaging waste) and additional transport costs. Refuse collection can 
have direct links between drop-off containers and landfills, but the separated waste must be 
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 This is usually the case for glass, paper/cardboard, and plastics; the case of metal packaging might 
constitute the most notable exception. 
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transported to the sorting facility first, then to the storing or recycling facilities. Naturally, the 
whole process is not free of certain environmental impacts (Ettehadieh, 2011).  
 
Taking these two conflicting aspects into account, one should also bear in mind that, recycling 
can be a source of technological innovation and job creation.  Perhaps even more important, it 
might be a catalyst for making the industries internalize the environmental and social impacts 
associated with their activities. Ultimately, if one can find the optimal recycling rates
2
 (for each 
type of material and considering the influence of other strategies such as incineration with 
energy recovery) it might be possible to achieve a lower overall economic cost (Highfill and 
Mcasey, 2001). However, these objectives might not be achieved if the imposed policy targets 
exceed the optimal recycling rates, undervaluing energy recovery or other alternative waste 
management strategies (Kinnaman, 2009). From the “public interest” point of view (i.e. what is 
best for society and well-being in general), to achieve an optimal solution within the European 
Union is also problematic due to the complexity and heterogeneity of the institutional 
arrangements/systems (Alwaeli, 2010). 
 
According to the polluter-pays principle and the PPW Directive (Directive 94/62/EC on 
packaging and packaging waste) “those involved in the production, use, import and distribution 
of packaging and packaged products” must accept the responsibility for managing packaging 
waste (Bailey, 1999). Consumers and public authorities should cooperate with the economic 
operators (suppliers of packaging material, packaging producers and converters, fillers and 
users, importers, traders and distributors) in the implementation of measures to manage this 
waste in an environmentally sound manner, within a spirit of shared responsibility (Coggins, 
2001). Nevertheless, at the heart of the PPW Directive lays the principle that the economic 
operators that introduce packaging to the market are fully responsible for the fate of this 
packaging. The concerned economic operators should enter into voluntary agreements with the 
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 Where the ratio of all benefits to all costs reaches its maximum. 
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competent authorities of each member state in order to fulfill the objectives and targets of the 
Directive (Bailey, 2002). 
 
In this paper we examine the packaging waste management system of Portugal. After describing 
the various components of the system, we compare the costs incurred by the waste management 
operators with the financial support coming from the industry. In the analysis we include the 
cost savings that local/regional authorities attain by diverting waste from landfills and the return 
on capital that should have been provided by the construction of the new infrastructures and the 
acquisition of the equipment required for setting up the recycling system. Finally, this 
investigation opens a debate on whether or not the principles of the PPW Directive are being 
interpreted correctly by all stakeholders. 
 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: after the introduction, section 2 presents a 
brief overview of the life-cycle of packaging waste; in that section, we discuss the logistics 
chain of packaging waste, the specific impacts of the recycling system and the extended 
producer responsibility (EPR) principle. In section 3 we describe the Portuguese packaging 
waste management system while section 4 addresses the main financial transfers in detail. The 
data and methodology are presented in section 5 and section 6 comprises the results and 
discussion. Finally, section 7 concludes the article. 
 
 
2. THE LIFE-CYCLE OF PACKAGING WASTE 
 
In the life-cycle management of municipal waste, the “cradle” can be regarded as the moment 
that an item is perceived by a consumer as valueless and is discarded (Cleary, 2009). The usual 
“grave” of municipal waste occurs when it is turned into inert landfilled material.3 However, for 
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 The percentage of waste that is simply transformed into air and water emissions (Özeler et al., 
2006) should be minimal. 
5 
the specific case of packaging waste, one should bear in mind that it can have two distinct types 
of “graves”: landfilling and recovery (its value is restored as energy – energy recovery, or a 
useable material – recycling). In the case of recovery, there is no actual “grave” since the 
materials are used for a different (and valuable) end. 
 
Considering only the main material flows within the systems, figure 1 breaks down the possible 
paths of packaging waste (from “cradle to grave”). The post-consumption stages of the 
packaging life-cycle include collection, sorting, treatment and/or final disposal (Shmelev and 
Powell, 2006). Indeed, not all packaging waste enters into the recycling system. Even though 
some of the material placed in undifferentiated (or refuse) collection containers can be 
recovered (e.g. incinerated with energy recovery), most of it is landfilled. For systems with 
mechanical biological treatment (MBT) infrastructures, such as composting facilities, some of 
the packaging waste can be retrieved and reallocated to recycling (although, occasionally, the 
products of composting might be disposed of in landfills due to their low quality and/or market 
value). 
 
 
[Insert figure 1] 
 
 
Not all recycling systems are identical and several strategies can be adopted. Differences are 
associated with the form of collection, sorting, disassembly (if necessary) and recycling, the 
management models, the actors involved, the types of facilities available and the cost structure 
of each step of the life-cycle (Bohm et al., 2010). Municipal waste management and, 
particularly, recycling systems have financial impacts (e.g. the costs of building and operating 
sorting facilities) and economic impacts (e.g. the savings attained by diverting waste from 
landfills). In truth, the valuation of environmental impacts (emissions affecting water and air 
ecosystems) should also be considered when performing cost-benefit analysis of recycling 
6 
programs (Shmelev and Powell, 2006). Cleary (2009) stresses the importance of defining the 
system boundaries and, by reviewing the relevant literature, he lists the following environmental 
impact categories as being the most common in life-cycle assessment (LCA) studies of waste 
management systems: 
 
 Acidification potential; 
 Global warming potential; 
 Eutrophication of surface water; 
 Resource consumption. 
 
LCA has been considered as a useful tool to take into account all the “cradle to grave” impacts 
associated with a product or service (Barton et al., 1996). Currently, there is the notion that the 
LCA of a municipal waste system should include both an environmental and a financial life-
cycle costing (LCC, Reich, 2005). Nevertheless, the environmental valuation techniques still 
include a high level of subjectivity. Also, the competent authorities strive just to have an 
accurate perception of the financial (extra) costs imposed on local waste management systems 
due to recycling. In this paper, we widen the scope of a strictly financial analysis, evaluating the 
impacts also from an economic viewpoint (see section 5).
4
 While we perform a financial LCC of 
the packaging waste management system, we also take into account the indirect financial 
impacts resulting from the packaging waste diverted from landfills and the return on capital of 
the investments made on the recycling system. 
 
Our study focuses on the segment of the life-cycle of packaging waste that goes from collection 
to the end of sorting (just before the items are sold to recyclers and reprocessed by them). We 
do this because our objective is to determine the added cost for the public sector entities and 
compare it with the financial transfers undertaken by the industry (i.e. the Green Dot company). 
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 Although in this paper we do not consider the positive and negative environmental effects of recycling 
and recovering packaging waste as in an environmental life-cycle costing (see Reich, 2005). 
7 
In other words, our approach consists of an assessment of the application of the EPR principle 
regarding the packaging waste sector. The EPR is “an environmental policy approach in which a 
producer’s responsibility for a product is extended to the post-consumer stage of a product’s life 
cycle” (OECD, 2001). Many authors have carried out work on this matter, often reaching 
diverging conclusions. For instance, Pearce and Turner (1992) suggest that EPR is might not be 
an efficient policy. They argue that many environmental effects have already been internalized, 
and EPR leads to “double taxation”; in their own words (Pearce and Turner, 1992, p. 12): “some 
of these costs, e.g. ambient air and water pollution costs, are already at least partially 
internalized by national and European Community environmental protection legislation. Thus 
there is the danger of a misspecification of targets and instruments in this packaging context, 
with the end result being the double counting of pollution damage costs (polluter pays twice).” 
Other authors have claimed that EPR is crucial for environmental sustainability (e.g. Hanisch, 
2000). 
 
 
3. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The PPW Directive was adopted in 1994 and had three main objectives (Bongaerts and Kemp, 
2000): (1) reduce the impact of packaging and packaging waste on the environment; (2) 
harmonize national legislation on packaging and packaging waste in order to prevent barriers to 
trade and market distortions; (3) ensure the free movement of packaged goods. According to 
this Directive, by the end of 2001 the member states should at least have recovered 50% (with a 
maximum of 65%) and recycled 25% (with a maximum of 45%) of all packaging waste (see 
table 1). The minimum recycling rate for each type of material was 15%. In 2004 the Directive 
was amended (2004/12/EC) and the targets were updated. As shown in table 1, by the end of 
2008, member states should have recovered a minimum of 60% by weight of packaging waste, 
where the recycling targets for each material were 60% by weight for glass, paper and board, 
50% by weight for metals, 22.5% by weight for plastics and 15% by weight for wood (the 
8 
overall target for recycling was 55%, with a maximum of 80%). Greece, Ireland and Portugal 
were initially allowed to postpone the 2001 and 2008 targets (to 2005 and 2011, respectively) 
mainly due to the special physical constraints of these countries. In Portugal, the PPW Directive 
was transposed into the national law in 1997 and the new targets were laid down in 2006.  
 
[Insert table 1] 
 
The Portuguese Environment Agency (APA in the Portuguese acronym) has the responsibility 
of developing and monitoring the implementation of waste management strategies. APA issues 
licenses for all waste management operations and has operational and administrative control 
over waste transfers. Those responsible for introducing packaged products on the domestic 
market shall report annually to APA the statistics on the quantities of reusable and non-reusable 
packaging supplied, the quantities of packaging placed on the market that were effectively 
reused and recovered and also the quantities delivered to the entities responsible for recovery or 
disposal. 
 
According to the national law, the responsibility for the management of packaging waste can be 
transferred by the industry to an entity duly licensed for this activity. The Sociedade Ponto 
Verde (SPV), a Green Dot company, is a private, non-profit organization with the aim of 
promoting separate collection, sorting, recovery and recycling of packaging waste in Portugal 
(encompassing packaging of fast-moving consumer goods and of industrial products). SPV is 
the main actor involved in the recycling of packaging waste. However, two other entities are 
responsible for specific packaging waste streams: Valorfito (agricultural packaging) and 
Valormed (pharmaceutical packaging); these types of packaging waste do not enter the 
municipal systems. 
 
The responsibility of SPV regarding the collection and recovery of packaging waste is 
operationalized through contracts with municipalities or with multi-municipal or intermunicipal 
9 
systems that have been awarded the concession for the selective collection and sorting of waste, 
and with guarantors and/or recyclers of packaging materials. 
 
Waste management activities can be categorized into “retail” and “wholesale” services, 
depending on the activities undertaken by the operators. In Portugal, the waste sector is clearly 
divided into these two segments (EIMPack, 2011a). The “retail” component covers the activities 
of refuse collection and transportation of household waste and is carried out primarily by 
municipal systems. The “wholesale” component encompasses the storing, transportation, 
sorting, treatment and disposal of urban waste. Massarutto (2006) uses the terms primary, 
secondary and tertiary market referring to “retail”, “wholesale” and recycling services, 
respectively. 
 
The Portuguese law states that municipalities are the competent authorities for the management 
of urban waste. However, local authorities often rely on multi-municipal companies for the 
delivery of “wholesale” waste services (in most cases, these entities are also in charge of 
selective collection, ERSAR, 2010). Multi-municipal companies consist of partnerships 
between a public company owned by the central state (Empresa Geral do Fomento – EGF) and 
the municipalities covered by the respective waste system. EGF owns 51% of the shares in these 
companies while the municipalities hold the remaining shares (minority participation). There are 
12 multi-municipal concessionaries currently in operation. Alternatively, local governments can 
create intermunicipal companies (100% municipally-owned or resulting from institutionalized 
public-private partnerships) for the delivery of these services. There are eight intermunicipal 
companies delivering “wholesale” waste services in Portugal. Finally, there are four 
associations of municipalities (direct public management), two intermunicipal services (direct 
public management) and one private concessionaire operating in this segment. To refer to the 
waste management systems irrespectively of the actual institutional arrangement, we will use 
the term “municipal systems and local authorities” (SMAUT in the Portuguese acronym). Table 
2 provides an overview of the current infrastructures for waste management in Portugal. 
10 
 
 
[Insert table 2] 
 
 
In 1997 the Portuguese government created a sector-specific regulator for water and waste 
services. The Water and Waste Services Regulation Authority (ERSAR in the Portuguese 
acronym) is an uncommon watchdog as there is usually no external regulator in the waste sector 
throughout the world (Marques and Simões, 2008). ERSAR is the competent authority to ensure 
the structural regulation of the waste sector and to promote the comparison and public 
disclosure of the operators’ performance through periodic reports (sunshine regulation via 
yardstick competition).
5
 This entity has the mission to protect the users’ interests and foster a 
good quality of service, always considering the economic sustainability of the utilities (Marques 
and Simões, 2009). Figure 2 provides a representation of the institutional framework described 
above. 
 
[Insert figure 2] 
 
In 10 years, the recovery rate of packaging waste in Portugal has increased significantly (from 
34.8% in 1998 to 66.0% in 2009). As can be seen in table 3, the last figures on recycling and 
recovery of packaging waste in Portugal show that the overall targets of the PPW Directive (that 
should be attained by this country by the end of 2011) had already been achieved in 2009. In 
terms of each packaging material, glass is still below the specific recycling target (60%), 
although this deviation is expected to have disappeared by December 2011. 
 
                                                          
5
 Sunshine regulation is based on measuring and comparing the performance of the operators. Yardstick 
competition is the process of creating an environment of “virtual” competition through benchmarking. 
11 
Currently, there are no official figures regarding the amounts of household and non-household 
packaging waste generated in Portugal. However, using information from SPV (2010) on the 
quantities and the origin of the packaging waste recovered, we are able to provide estimates for 
the proportion of urban and non-urban packaging waste (see table 3).
6
 Urban (or municipal) 
packaging waste includes materials coming from households and small businesses (see section 5 
for more detail); this specific packaging waste stream comprises the ‘household flow’. 
Packaging waste from other (non-urban) sources comprises the ‘trade and industry flow’. In 
2009, about 60% (1,031,564 tons) of all packaging waste was recycled, 6% (103156 tons) was 
incinerated with energy recovery, and 34% (584,553 tons) was landfilled. 
 
[Insert table 3] 
 
 
4. ANALYSIS OF THE FINANCIAL TRANSFERS 
 
4.1 Green dot fee 
 
In legal terms, packers or importers of packaged goods or products have two options: (1) 
develop their own system for taking back reusable packaging and non-reusable packaging – this 
system must be approved by the APA; (2) join the integrated system managed by SPV to take-
back non-reusable packaging – SPV was first licensed by the Ministries of Economy and the 
Environment in 1997. Thus far, all packers/importers chose to join the SPV system. 
 
The economic operators that join the integrated system transfer to SPV the responsibility for 
recycling and recovering the packaging they have produced and placed on the national market. 
These quantities are annually declared to SPV and reported to the APA. This transfer of 
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 We point out that, for all materials in table 3, the ‘urban’ quantities plus the ‘non-urban’ quantities equal 
the official figures reported by Eurostat. 
12 
responsibility is compensated through a Green Dot Fee (that may vary each year), 
corresponding to the unit values (per kg) of each type of packaging material (see table 4 for the 
2010 values). 
 
 
[Insert table 4] 
 
 
Packers and importers calculate their annual contribution by multiplying the total weight of each 
type of packaging material placed on the market by the respective fee (SPV, 2010). The 
objective is that the financial transfers made by the industry to the SPV, plus the net take-back 
values (paid by guarantors/recyclers), match the costs that the waste management operators 
have with the selective collection and sorting of packaging waste (household flow and trade and 
industry flow) and any investments made by SPV (including costs with marketing and R&D). 
 
 
4.2 Financial support for local authorities 
 
The financial support for local authorities (FSLA) corresponds to the value paid by the SPV to 
the multi-municipal or intermunicipal systems managed by local (or regional) authorities for the 
selective collection and sorting of packaging waste that they carry out. As can be seen in table 5, 
this payment is calculated using the values that correspond to a certain per capita rate (of 
sorting of packaging waste); the financial support also depends on each type of material (see 
table 5). The model is based on the efficiency of the packaging waste management systems and 
their per capita potential (SPV, 2010). 
 
 
[Insert table 5] 
13 
 
 
The FSLA model is implemented according to the scheme shown in figure 3. Until X1 the 
Green Dot agency pays P1 to the local authority, between X1 and X2 it pays P2, between X2 
and X3 it pays P3 (and for the per capita values over X3, SPV pays P1). X1 represents the 
national average take-back carried out by the SMAUTs; X2 corresponds to the take-back per 
capita required to comply with the targets of the PPW Directive for 2011; X3 is the potential 
market for packaging (total packaging generated in Portugal–other than for industrial or similar 
use–divided by the population). This “stairway” payment scheme encourages municipalities and 
SMAUTs to maximize their commitment to separate collection and also allows for different 
levels of incentives regarding each type of packaging waste material. Once SPV pays the FSLA, 
the packaging waste becomes its property. Therefore, SPV can afterwards sell the sorted 
packaging materials to guarantors/recyclers. 
 
 
[Insert figure 3] 
 
 
4.3 Complementary report fee 
 
The FSLA and the direct intervention of SPV concerning the final destination of packaging 
waste only encompasses the materials that come through the selective collection chain. 
Nonetheless, other packaging waste that is recovered or recycled through the “traditional” 
refuse collection chain (e.g. via composting or incineration) needs to be accounted for by the 
SPV. Hence, the Green Dot company pays a complementary report fee (CRF) to the entities in 
charge of the waste management systems. Table 6 presents the complementary report fee for 
2010. This table contains the unit values that SPV pays to the SMAUTs, according to the type 
of recovery. Note that, for the incineration slag, the SMAUTs can opt for selling it directly to an 
14 
interested buyer (and they receive a value from SPV for the information), or for selling it to 
SPV (and they receive a value from SPV, according to the first two rows of table 6). 
 
 
[Insert table 6] 
 
 
4.4 Information and motivation fee 
 
In a similar fashion to what happens with packaging waste not coming from selective collection, 
the SPV does not have a direct intervention regarding the circuit of non-household packaging 
waste (trade and industry flow). However, it collects information from the waste management 
systems on the trade and industrial packaging waste sent for recycling (SPV, 2010). The waste 
management operators (65 in 2009) report the amounts of all trade and industry materials 
collected and sent for recycling or recovery. For this reporting an information and motivation 
fee is paid per ton of packaging waste material, as it is shown in table 7. 
 
 
[Insert table 7] 
 
 
5. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Our approach does not consider the “net take-back values” which correspond to the financial 
transfers between the SPV (who owns the packaging waste after paying the FSLA) and the 
guarantors/recyclers. One would have to account for these amounts (as benefits) if the objective 
was to compute the extra-cost of recycling from the industry point of view. Indeed, we only 
wish to assess the extra-cost incurred by local authorities due to the procedures, equipment and 
15 
infrastructure necessary for the recycling of packaging waste. Afterwards, we intend to compare 
this value with the revenues attained by local authorities for the same purpose. 
 
An economic analysis regarding the degree to which the costs of recycling are being covered by 
the industry needs to take into account two components that are usually disregarded in a strictly 
financial analysis (Pires, 2011): (1) on the costs side, the return on capital employed (debt and 
equity) regarding the financing of the assets allocated to the recycling process (e.g. selective 
collection equipment and sorting infrastructures), even though, in Portugal (and in other 
countries, such as France, Le Bozec, 2008), the majority of the systems are managed by public 
entities; (2) on the benefits (revenues) side, the savings that derive from the diversion of waste 
from refuse collection and landfilling activities. Figure 4 shows the various components of the 
costs and benefits (direct and indirect revenues) of the recycling system in Portugal.
7
 We should 
mention that, for a full estimation of the economic benefits and costs of recycling, one should 
consider the valuation of environmental externalities (e.g., reduced CO2 emissions). However, 
this is not done in the current paper. According to the PPW Directive, and if one perceives the 
EPR as being the main principle, it seems that the two first components of the benefits (FSLA 
plus the “other benefits attained from direct transactions with recyclers”) should match all the 
(efficient) costs in figure 4. 
 
 
[Insert figure 4] 
 
 
To compute the average costs and benefits that local authorities have with recycling in Portugal, 
we have determined all the components shown in Figure 4 encompassing 27 entities for the year 
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 Note that the relative magnitudes of the various components of the bar charts are just illustrative and do 
not necessarily correspond to reality (e.g., the benefits could be less or more than the costs, as shown later 
in this paper). 
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2010 (the sample covers the whole Portuguese population, i.e., around 10.5 million). Our 
analysis concerns the management of the household flow which corresponds to around 60% of 
all the recovered material in Portugal (SPV, 2010). The trade and industry flow does not involve 
selective collection and sorting operations (the packaging waste is sorted at the source and 
collected by specialized waste management operators that receive the information and 
motivation fee). Hence, the analysis excludes the packaging waste generated by industrial and 
large commercial entities. Businesses that produce packaging waste that is similar in its nature 
and composition to that from households and whose production of packaging waste does not 
exceed 1100 liters/day are allowed to integrate the household flow (i.e. use the infrastructures 
provided by local authorities). 
 
On the benefits side, the total FSLA was computed by multiplying the quantities of each 
material (declared by the entities in their annual reports) by the respective value (according to 
the scheme shown in table 5). The “other benefits attained from direct transactions with 
recyclers” were found in the companies’ annual reports (among other sources, the revenue from 
selling non-packaging paper that is discarded in drop-off containers is accounted for in this 
component). The subsidies to the investments made on the equipment and infrastructure 
allocated to selective collection and sorting activities were also determined through the 
companies’ reports; these subsidies are accounted for annually and adjusted in the same 
proportion as the depreciation of the subsidized assets. The cost saving which results from 
diverting waste from the refuse collection chain and landfilling was calculated separately and 
according to the following equations: 
 
(€/ton)
collection
refuse ofcost Unit 
ton/year)(
collectedy selectivel
 wasteofQuantity 
)€/year(
collection refuse
 withavoided Costs
  (1) 
 
€/ton)(
disposal and
 treatmentofcost Unit 
(ton/year)
recovered
 wasteofQuantity 
)€/year(
 treatmentwaste
 withavoided Costs
  (2) 
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To estimate the unit costs of refuse collection a survey was sent to all municipalities. From the 
308 Portuguese municipalities we obtained 196 answers, and the results pointed out to a unit 
cost of refuse collection of 49 €/ton (the unit costs were computed through a weighted average 
using the tons of refuse collected as weights). The unit cost of treatment and disposal was 
obtained through the annual reports for 2010, after the costs of recycling were removed, 
resulting in a value of 53.9 €/ton (weighted average). These unit values include operational and 
capital costs. To find out the efficiencies of the sorting of each material, a different survey was 
developed and sent to all 27 SMAUTs. We obtained the weighted (by the tons of selectively 
collected waste) values of 99% for glass, 93% for paper/cardboard and 63% for other materials. 
The quantity of packaging waste of each material collected through selective collection is equal 
to the quantity of packaging waste recovered, divided by the respective efficiency of sorting. 
The residues of the sorting process are usually sent to landfills, so this cost is not avoided for a 
small percentage of the packaging waste collected (note that for plastics this percentage is not 
irrelevant). 
 
On the costs side, the operation costs of selective collection and sorting and the depreciation of 
the assets allocated to these activities were obtained from the survey results and from the annual 
accounts of the SMAUTs. The return on capital employed regarding the investments made on 
selective collection and sorting equipment and infrastructure was calculated through equations 
(3) and (4):
8
 
 
  (%/year) WACC)years(
assets  theof
life Useful
(€/year) subsidies-onDepreciati)€/year(
employed
capital on Return
  (3) 
 
 
(%)Debt (%)debt  ofCost 
(%) tax corporate-1
(%)Equity 
(%)equity  ofCost )%( WACC   (4) 
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 WACC – Weighted Average Cost of Capital. 
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The values of useful life of the assets (9.6 years), percentage of equity in the capital structure 
(19.0%), corporate tax (20.3%) and the cost of debt (4.6%) were computed taking into account 
the survey and the annual reports of the SMAUTs. Note that we computed the useful life of the 
assets dividing the net assets by the net depreciation. All these constants correspond to average 
values weighted by the tons of selectively collected waste. The cost of equity (6%) includes 
both a non-risk component (of 3%) and a risk premium (of 3%) based on the German 10-year 
bond yields for 2010 (according to the Bundesbank). Taking into account these values, we 
obtained a WACC of 5.5%. 
 
If one considers the revenue structure of SPV it is possible to develop a notion of the relevance 
of the sale of sorted material for the economic sustainability of the Portuguese recycling system. 
Indeed, one should bear in mind two aspects: (1) in Portugal, the Green Dot agency is a non-
profit company (unlike what happens, for instance, in Germany, Bundeskartellamt, 2011); (2) in 
Portugal, once the Green Dot company pays the FSLA, it owns the sorted materials and has the 
responsibility/possibility of selling it to recyclers or guarantors (unlike what happens, for 
instance, in France, Eco-Emballages, 2011). Looking at the last four annual reports of SPV 
(2006-09), it is possible to ascertain that the net take-back values correspond to around 15% of 
the total financial transfers to local authorities. 
 
 
6. THE EXTRA COST OF RECYCLING 
 
After computing all the components of the revenues and costs shown in figure 4, we found that, 
on average, the SMAUTs benefit 369 € per ton of packaging waste that is sent for recycling (or 
260 € per ton of waste selectively collected). Adopting a strictly financial perspective, the 
benefits amount to a total of 223 € per ton of packaging waste recycled or 157 € per ton 
collected. On the other hand, each ton of packaging waste forwarded to recycling costs the local 
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authorities an average of 289 €; if we compute this value for each ton of waste selectively 
collected, the cost is 204 €. All unit costs and benefits are weighted by the tons recovered by 
each SMAUT. These unit costs are shown in figure 5 using the tons of waste selectively 
collected and in figure 6 using the tons of packaging waste recycled. The differences are due to 
the efficiency of the sorting of each material and to the presence of non-packaging items in the 
drop-off containers.  
 
As can easily be seen in figures 5 and 6, currently the cost coverage is around 127% considering 
an economic perspective but only 77% if the cost savings due to recycling are not taken into 
account. If one accepts that financial transfers should follow an economic approach (i.e. taking 
into account the savings derived from diverting packaging waste from landfill), the FSLA 
should be globally reduced by 42% ( %42100
€130
€260€204

 ). On the other hand, if the policy 
was to make the industry 100% accountable for its packaging waste, exempting local authorities 
of any financial responsibility (such as in the German Dual System, MS2 and Perchards, 2009), 
the FSLA should increase by 37% ( %37100
€130
€)103€260(€205

 ). This increase should even 
be higher if the (public) subsidies to the investments made on the assets allocated to selective 
collection and sorting activities are not considered on the benefits side (i.e. if one believes that 
no public money whatsoever should be financing what ought to be an exclusive responsibility of 
the industry). 
 
 
[Insert figure 5] 
 
[Insert figure 6] 
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To simplify the comparison with the costs of refuse collection and treatment, figure 7 provides 
the unit cost split between selective collection and sorting. In this figure the costs are presented 
in Euros per ton collected. As can easily be seen, sorting is around 72 €/ton (excluding return on 
capital, to be comparable with the unit costs obtained for managing mixed waste). Selective 
collection is around 117 €/ton (excluding return on capital). 
 
[Insert figure 7] 
 
These results are interesting mainly for three reasons: 
 
(1) The discussion on whether the cost coverage should be strictly financial or consider an 
economic approach. If one was to consider the polluter-pays principle as the main issue in 
the recycling of packaging waste, it seems that the purely financial approach would apply. 
Furthermore, according to this principle, the industry should also pay for the fraction of 
packaging waste that gets landfilled (which currently does not happen). The only way to 
estimate the quantity of packaging waste that is currently landfilled is using the official 
information displayed in table 3. According to the latest available data, around 600,000 
tons of packaging waste are landfilled with no costs for the industry 
(  ton584,5530.66)-(1657,639)(1,061,635  ).
9
 
However, this approach would face several difficulties. On the one hand, it would be very 
difficult to set a framework of incentives if local authorities would get paid irrespectively 
of what was the packaging waste final destination (although payments could differ 
between recycling and landfilling). Currently, it is already difficult to account for the 
actual cost-efficiency of the SMAUTs. A solution for this problem would be a dual 
                                                          
9
 We have already mentioned the quantity of packaging waste that was incinerated in 2009 
(  ton103,1560.61)-(0.66657,639)(1,061,635  ).  Thus, the cost of treating this quantity of 
packaging waste should be approximately equal to 60,000,000€ ( 9.021103,156)+(584,553  ). One 
should note, however, that the SPV pays the CRF fee to the local authorities that recover packaging waste 
through composting or incineration. 
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system in line with the German model for managing packaging waste (e.g. see EIMPack, 
2011b). However, in Portugal, local authorities own the infrastructure and the national 
law states that municipalities are the competent authorities regarding urban waste 
management. Hence, implementing a German-like system, where public authorities 
merely manage the “undifferentiated collection flow” while the industry is solely 
responsible for managing the “selective collection flow” (using their own infrastructures), 
seems unlikely in practice.
10
 
 
(2) The possibility of performing cross-national comparisons regarding the costs and benefits 
of recycling packaging waste (from the waste management operators’ perspective). 
Finding international benchmarks is crucial to assess the impacts of the PPW Directive in 
each member state. In fact, efforts could be made in order to harmonize these values. 
Furthermore, since waste management operators are monopolists in their territorial area, 
incentives for cost-efficiency could take into account these benchmarks (e.g. publicizing 
the graph in figure 7 for each operator could potentially be an effective whilst low-cost 
procedure to improve overall performance). 
 
(3) The substantial difference between the unit costs of the undifferentiated collection and 
selective collection flows. The costs of refuse collection and waste treatment (e.g. 
landfilling and composting) are estimated to be around 102.9€ per ton of waste collected 
(note that this value includes depreciation but not the return on capital). Selective 
collection and sorting seems to be significantly more costly. In fact, if we compute the 
unit cost of selective collection and sorting per tons collected (which includes non-
packaging items and waste that will be allocated to landfills during sorting) not taking 
                                                          
10
 Moreover, in Germany, the packaging waste recycling market was opened to competition and there are 
now nine private entities responsible for ensuring the recovery of packaging waste. Packaging waste is 
collected, treated and disposed under the direct intervention of these dual system companies (see 
EIMPack 2011b). The Duales System Deutschland GmbH (DSD) was the first of these companies; it was 
also the precursor of the Green Dot system, later adopted throughout the EU. Initially, DSD was a non-
profit company such as SPV (Portugal) or Eco-Emballages (France). 
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into account the return on capital, the value for the “recycling flow” is considerably 
higher (around 189€ per ton of waste selectively collected). Although there might be 
some technical justifications for these differences, one cannot easily determine if this 
phenomenon is, at least partially, being driven by an attempt of the local authorities to 
allocate waste management costs towards the packaging industry. Moreover, it remains 
undetermined to what extent these costs are due to inefficiency. Currently, the SMAUTs 
do not have an accounting system that allows them to clearly report the costs for separate 
collection and sorting (i.e. disentangle them from the mixed waste management costs). It 
falls beyond the scope of this paper to address this issue in detail; nevertheless, our 
analysis shows that it is important to accomplish this in the near future. 
 
Finally, regarding the total cost of managing household packaging waste in Portugal (the one 
which enters the separate collection flow), it should be approximately 85,000,000 €. This value 
was taken directly from the SMAUTs annual reports. The total cost of urban waste management 
in this country is approximately 630,000,000 €. This cost was obtained by adding up the costs 
incurred by the municipalities with refuse collection to the costs of the SMAUTs with the 
treatment of mixed waste. The cost of the collection and sorting of household packaging waste 
should therefore be around 13% of the total costs undertaken by local authorities with urban 
waste management: this corresponds to 0.05% of Portugal’s GDP (total urban waste costs have 
a weight of 0.37% in the GDP). 
 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This study presents the costs and benefits of packaging waste recycling in Portugal and includes 
two components that can be left out of strictly financial assessments: the return on capital 
employed (debt and equity) regarding the financing of the assets allocated to the recycling 
process and the cost saving which results from diverting waste from the refuse collection and 
landfilling activities. 
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In addition to contributing with information regarding the unit (per ton) costs and benefits of 
selective collection and sorting of packaging waste (which are still unusual facts in the 
literature, EIMPack, 2011b) this paper opens a debate on whether or not the costs of the 
recycling system should be entirely borne by the economic operators (e.g. packers and 
importers). In Portugal, the costs of refuse collection and waste treatment (other than recycling) 
are not negligible (49.0€ and 53.9€ per ton collected, respectively) and in countries with more 
limited land resources these costs can even be higher. Hence, the question of whether these 
savings should be accounted for as a benefit of recycling is quite pertinent. On the other hand, 
comparing the costs of refuse collection and treatment (102.9€ per ton collected) with the costs 
of selective collection and sorting (268€ per ton of packaging recovered, or around 189€ per ton 
collected – excluding return on capital employed for both figures) leave us with a daring 
question: is it possible that local authorities are inflating their “recycling costs” because they are 
expecting retribution from the industry?  
 
We believe that the return on capital employed on the assets allocated to selective collection and 
sorting of packaging waste should be accounted for even if waste management operators are 
public entities. Public money is increasingly regarded as yet another scarce resource and thus it 
should be managed with concerns for economic sustainability. Choosing between a financial or 
an economic approach is ultimately a policy decision. Currently, the principle of shared 
responsibility seems to be embedded in the Portuguese recycling framework. However, the 
main principle of the PPW Directive is that the industry should bear 100% of the costs of 
managing packaging waste (the EPR principle). The Green Dot Agency is only bearing 77% of 
the financial costs of the recycling systems in operation in Portugal. This figure would be even 
lower if one did not take into account the public subsidies for investments in selective collection 
and sorting infrastructures, which were accounted for as benefits of the waste management 
operators in the current study. 
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Although there are some similarities with the French model (Eco-Emballages, 2011), the 
Portuguese system for managing packaging waste is slightly different. In Portugal, the 
packaging waste belongs to the Green Dot agency once it pays the FSLA (this transfer includes 
the market value of recyclables implicitly). This way, local authorities are “protected” from 
fluctuations on the secondary raw material market. Nevertheless, the current system could be 
improved mainly in three areas: (1) providing incentives for cost efficiency to the SMAUTs; (2) 
developing a mandatory accounting system for the SMAUTs that allows them to report the costs 
of managing mixed waste and packaging waste separately (these costs should be disaggregated 
and easily audited); (3) ensuring that the industry pays for 100% of the efficient extra-costs of 
the SMAUTs due to the recycling system.
11
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11
 That is to say that the industry does not have the duty of financing the possible cost-inefficiency of 
local authorities. For instance, SPV could cover the efficient benchmark costs of the selective collection 
and treatment services carried out by waste management operators. 
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Figure 1 – The life-cycle of packaging waste: material flows (simplified) 
  
 
Figure 2 – Scheme of the Portuguese recycling sector (household flow) 
  
 
Figure 3 – Model for the application of the FSLA 
 
  
 
Figure 4 – Benefits (direct and indirect revenues) and costs of recycling of packaging waste in 
Portugal 
  
 
Figure 5 – Cost coverage considering aggregated tons (values in Euros per ton selectively collected) 
  
 
Figure 6 – Cost coverage considering aggregated tons (values in Euros per ton recycled) 
  
 
Figure 7 – Unit cost of selective collection and sorting per tons collected  
 Table 1 – Recycling and recovery targets (by weight of packaging waste) for EU member states 
Directive Deadline 
Recovery 
targets 
Recycling targets 
Overall Glass 
Paper / 
Cardboard 
Metals Plastic Wood 
94/62/CE 31/12/2001 50% 25% 15% 15% 15% 15% (–) 
2004/12/CE 31/12/2008 60% 55% 60% 60% 50% 22,5% 15% 
 
 Table 2 – Infrastructure for urban waste management (SPV, 2010) 
Infrastructure no. 
Landfills 41 
Incinerators 3 
Composting facilities 14 
Transfer stations 91 
Sorting stations 337 
Drop-off centers 204 
Drop-off containers 40,278 
 
 Table 3 – Recycling and recovery in Portugal in 2009 (Source: Eurostat) 
Material 
Packaging waste 
generated (ton) 
Recycling
a
 
(ton) 
Recovery
b
 
(ton) 
Overall 
recycling 
rate (%) 
Overall 
recovery 
rate (%) urban non-urban   urban non-urban urban non-urban 
Glass 418,259 1,858 231,435 1,082 231,435 1,082 55 55 
Plastic 302,834 75,234 69,089 27,245 98,148 38,703 25 36 
Paper and board 271,645 439,050 206,441 358,776 226,632 393,867 80 87 
Metals 55,539 44,561 28,362 36,121 28,362 36,121 64 64 
Wood 13,357 96,937 8,643 63,357 9,312 68,259 65 70 
Total 1,061,635 657,639 608,111 422,440 667,928 463,993 60 66 
a Recycling includes material recycling and other forms of recycling like composting; 
b Recovery includes total recycling and incineration with energy recovery 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 4 – Green dot fee for 2010 
Packaging of fast moving consumer 
goods 
Primary 
(€/kg) 
Secondary 
(€/kg) 
Tertiary 
(€/kg) 
Glass 0.0183 – – 
Plastic 0.2282 0.0923 0.0238 
Paper and cardboard 0.0836 0.0352 0.0070 
Composite packaging 0.1294 – – 
Steel 0.0960 0.0417 0.0244 
Aluminum 0.1644 – – 
Wood 0.0154 0.0142 0.0091 
Other materials 0.2600 0.2600 0.2600 
Packaging of industrial products 
Primary 
(€/kg) 
Secondary 
(€/kg) 
Tertiary 
(€/kg) 
Glass 0.0135 – – 
Plastic 0.0238 0.0238 0.0238 
Paper and cardboard 0.0070 0.0070 0.0070 
Steel 0.0244 0.0244 0.0244 
Aluminum 0.0494 – – 
Wood 0.0091 0.0091 0.0091 
Other materials 0.0550 0.0550 0.0550 
Packaging of dangerous industrial 
products 
Primary 
(€/kg) 
Secondary 
(€/kg) 
Tertiary 
(€/kg) 
Glass 0.0135 – – 
Plastic 0.0238 0.0238 0.0238 
Paper and cardboard 0.0070 0.0070 0.0070 
Steel 0.0244 0.0244 0.0244 
Aluminum 0.0494 – – 
Wood – – 0.0091 
Shopping bags    
Plastic 0.2282 
Paper and cardboard 0.0863 
Note: the VAT at the current legal rate should be added to these amounts 
 
 Table 5 – FSLA for the period 2008-2010 (Source: Order No. 10287/2009) 
Material 
X1 X2 X3 P1 P2 P3 
kg/inh/year €/ton 
Glass 14.30 24.50 40.80 35.00 48.00 60.00 
Plastic 2.10 3.60 15.30 770.00 823.00 876.00 
Paper and board 8.00 10.0 15.00 135.00 151.00 166.00 
Steel 0.40 0.70 4.10 600.00 644.00 688.00 
Aluminum 0.02 0.04 0.86 766.00 1.016.00 1.283.00 
Composite packaging 0.30 1.80 3.00 770.00 823.00 876.00 
Mixed plastics – – – 245.00 245.00 245.00 
Wood – – – 15.87 15.87 15.87 
 
 Table 6 – Complementary report fee (2011) 
Incineration slag (requested take-back) 
Steel 85.00 €/ton 
Aluminium 575.00 €/ton 
Incineration slag (direct transaction by collection operator) 
Steel 15.00 €/ton 
Aluminium 35.00 €/ton 
Composting (direct transaction by collection operator) 
Glass 5.00 €/ton 
Cardboard 5.00 €/ton 
Film 275.00 €/ton 
HDPE 275.00 €/ton 
PET 180.00 €/ton 
Steel 15.00 €/ton 
Aluminium 35.00 €/ton 
 
 Table 7 – Information and motivation fee 
Material 
Glass 5.00 €/ton 
Paper/cardboard 5.00 €/ton 
Plastic 15.00 €/ton 
Steel 15.00 €/ton 
Alumnium 35.00 €/ton 
Wood 5.00 €/ton 
 
 
